Original Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) has become widespread in
recent times for various aspects , including medical aspects. Some of which aims to extend human life
and delay the signs of aging. The research problem of this study lies in clarifying the perspective of
Islamic jurisprudence on the intervention of technology in the human body. The objectives of this
research is to discuss the technological interventions aimed at extending human life and delaying the
signs of aging, and to explore the jurisprudential ruling. The research adopted a descriptive and
deductive research approach to obtain the research objectives. Regarding technological interventions
aimed at prolonging human life and delaying the signs of aging, the study divided these interventions
into three approaches. The first is the biological method that is based on advances in genetics and
biotechnology and focuses on enhancing the immune system genetically. The study concluded that such
method is impermissible. The second method is the electronic method which is based on advances in
nanotechnology and robotics, and focuses on various parts of the body with artificial substitutes, such
as artificial skin. The study found that the ruling on such method varies depending on the situation. As
such, replacing damaged human body parts with prosthetic limbs is regarded permissible since it falls
under the type of medical treatment. Moreover, regarding the technological interventions to enhance
human capabilities, it is found that an in-depth study is required to explore such an issue. The third
method is the virtual method known as mind uploading which involves digitizing the information contained
in the brain -such as memories, and information- and then transferring it to a machine. From the
perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, this method is considered permissible; however, it must not cause
any harm to the brain.
Original Abstract: Abstract
Could we transfer you from your biological substrate to an electronic hardware by simulating your brain
on a computer? The answer to this question divides optimists and pessimists about mind uploading.
Optimists believe that you can genuinely survive the transition; pessimists think that surviving mind
uploading is impossible. An influential argument against uploading optimism is the multiplicity
objection. In a nutshell, the objection is as follows: If uploading optimism were true, it should be
possible to create not only one, but multiple digital versions of you. However, you cannot literally
become many. Hence, you cannot survive even a single instance of uploading, and optimism about uploading
is misguided. In this paper, I will first spell out the multiplicity objection in detail and then
provide a two-pronged defence against the objection. First, uploading pessimists cannot establish that
uploading optimism has the contentious implication. Second, it is in fact plausible to think that we
could become multiple distinct persons. Optimists’ hope for a digital afterlife is therefore not
thwarted by the prospect of multiplicity.
Original Abstract: Thief of Truth is a first-person perspective Virtual
Reality (VR) comic that explores the relationship between humans and artificial intelligence (AI). The
work tells the story of a mind-uploaded human being reborn as a new subject while interacting with an AI
that is looking for the meaning of life. In order to experiment with the expandability of VR comics, the
work was produced by focusing on three problems. First, the comic is designed using the viewing control
effect of VR. Second, through VR controller-based interaction, the player's immersion in the work
is increased. Third, a method for increasing accessibility to VR comics was devised. This work aims to
present an example of an experimental attempt in VR Comics.
Original Abstract: This article engages the concept of death as a
revolutionary transformation within the contexts of mind uploading (MU) and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s
theology of the Omega Point. The focus is not on the Omega Point itself as a conceptual endpoint, nor on
what becomes of consciousness once it has been successfully uploaded into a digital substrate. To grasp
the meaning of “death” within the context of MU, the article employs the notion of liminal speculative
imagination to analyze death amid the liminality of biological mortality and digital immortality. It
argues that death is more than just the end of life but rather as a transitional phase between different
states of being. It contends that this liminal gap between life forms is an inherent aspect of existence
that cannot be eliminated at a fundamental level. Instead of seeking to overcome death, the article
suggests embracing the transformative nature of this liminality. In this view, death is seen as a
natural and unavoidable part of life, serving as a mediator or catalyst for transitions into new forms
of existence. Rather than focusing solely on achieving immortality, the article advocates for utilizing
technology to facilitate evolution and advancement. By acknowledging the role of death in the process of
transformation, particularly within the context of transhumanism, the article proposes that embracing
liminality can lead to new possibilities for human evolution. This includes the potential emergence of
transhuman life forms, such as those enabled by MU technologies.
Original Abstract: Optimists about mind-uploading believe that we can
survive uploading. Pessimists about mind-uploading, on the other hand, believe that we cannot survive
uploading. An under-explored middle ground between the two is a selective form of optimism, which claims
that we can survive some
forms of uploading, such as gradual replacement uploading, but not others, such as scan-and-copy
uploading. Is selective optimism about uploading a rational stance? In this paper I argue that the
answer is yes. The paper has a negative and a positive part. First, I defuse an objection against
selective optimism from Wiley and Koene (2016). Wiley and Koene argue that gradual replacement uploading
is metaphysically equivalent to scanand-copy uploading, and hence optimism about the former and
pessimism about the latter is unfounded. I show that Wiley and Koene's case for the supposed
metaphysical equivalence fails, since there is a significant metaphysical contrast between the two types
of uploading involving immanent causation. In the second part of the paper, I present a positive case
for selective optimism about gradual uploading building on this contrast in immanent
causation.
Original Abstract: Philosophical concern for the human future is more
important today than ever because of the ethical, social, and technological challenges we face—Human
Enhancement (HE) and Transhumanism (H+) are some of the theories that are involved with the future of
our species. These two positions tend to be confused, but we contend that a distinction can and should
be made between the two approaches. To perform this explanation, we propose two axes of differentiation:
the concept of enhancement itself and the valuation of the biological body. In this context, H+ begins
with a disregard for the body and seeks to transcend the human condition with exponential enhancements,
while HE advocates a gradual enhancement within our current limits. Clarifying this contrast between H+
and HE is vital for the responsible adoption of future technologies, enabling informed decisions about
which scientific promises are viable and worthy of support, and which should be reconsidered.
Original Abstract: Con este artículo me propongo desenmascarar la metáfora
del trasplante de la mente porque cada vez se hace menos evidente la neutralidad corporal en la que está
fundada. En el primer apartado expongo la concepción de Moravec y de Kurzweil sobre el trasplante de la
mente con el fin de mostrar que un mismo tipo de mente no puede existir en cuerpos con propiedades
diferentes. Al contrario, al trasplantar la mente a un cuerpo artificial se abre la posibilidad de la
descentralización de la identidad, pues se consigue mezclar diferentes identidades que provienen de un
mismo cerebro. Para esto, me baso en la androide Bina48. En el segundo apartado, exploro la
descentralización de la identidad a partir de la voz autobiográfica de los órganos artificiales del
híbrido cibernético, basada en los argumentos expuestos en Natural-Born Cyborgs de Andy Clark. Así, en
ese apartado explico en qué consiste el sentido narrativo de sí mismo.
Original Abstract: What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms,
brains, or something else? In this book, Andrew Brenner argues that there are principled obstacles to
our discovering the answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. The main competing accounts of
personal ontology hold that we are either souls (or composites of soul and body), or we are composite
physical objects of some sort, but, as Brenner shows, arguments for either of these options can be
parodied and transformed into their opposites. Brenner also examines arguments for and against the
existence of the self, offers a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios -
resurrection, reincarnation, and mind uploading -- and considers whether agnosticism with respect to
personal ontology should lead us to agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death.
Original Abstract: Abstract
AI and robotic technologies are reshaping embodied experience, specifically experiences of the relation
of mind to body as well as experiences of “reality,” which necessitate the qualifiers augmented or
virtual. Such technologies have allowed people to infuse the expanding assortment of technological
experiences with spiritual meaning, thus expanding the ambit of spirituality and religiosity; at the
same time, the technology has provided many researchers with occasion to argue that all spiritual and
virtual experience—including of soul and deities—may only just ever be in the brain, putting the virtual
back into the body but not without changing each. We are comparing three sites—VR, gaming, and
transhuman mind uploading in Europe, the US, and Japan—not as sites of confusion but of “ontological
opportunity,” that is, occasions for remaking experiences of embodiment and disembodiment, and changing
the relation between reality and virtuality.
Original Abstract: AbstractThe digital transfer of the mind to a computer
system (i.e., mind uploading) requires representing the mind as a finite sequence of bits (1s and 0s).
The classic “stored-program computer” paradigm, in turn, implies the equivalence between program and
data, so that the sequence of bits themselves can be interpreted as a program, which will be
algorithmically executed in the receiving device. Now, according to a previous proof, on which this
paper is based, a computational or algorithmic machine, however complex, cannot be free (in the sense of
‘self-determined’). Consequently, a finite sequence of bits cannot adequately represent a free mind and,
therefore, a free mind cannot be digitally transferred, quod erat demonstrandum. The impossibility of
making this transfer, as demonstrated here, should be a concern especially for those who wish to achieve
it. Since we intend this to be a rigorous demonstration, we must give precise definitions and conditions
of validity. The most important part of the paper is devoted to explaining the meaning and
reasonableness of these definitions and conditions (for example that being truly free means being
self-determined). Special attention is paid, also, to the philosophical implications of the
demonstration. Finally, this thesis is distinguished from other closely related issues (such as other
possible technological difficulties to “discretize” the mind; or, whether it is possible to transfer the
mind from one material support to another one in a non-digital way).
Original Abstract: As a genre, science fiction has long played with the
idea of all-powerful virtual beings and explored notions of transcendence through technological
advancements. It has also been at the forefront of exploring our anxieties and hopes regarding new
technologies and the ethical and moral consequences of scientific advancement, raising deeply
philosophical and theological concerns about an age-old question, namely: what makes us distinct as
human beings and what lies beyond our own existence? This article aims to provide an overview of recent
themes that have emerged in science fiction film and television, especially with regard to extending our
lives beyond their natural biological age. As the article will outline, these ideas generally appear in
notions of cyborgization or mind uploading into cyberspace. Both indicate a deeply human desire to avoid
death, and the films and shows discussed in this article offer a range of different ideas on this. As we
will see, the final case study, the Amazon Prime television show Upload (2020–), brings both of these
elements together, touching on a broad range of ideas about cyber-spirituality along the way. The
article concludes that although many shows raise interesting questions about the ethical challenges
inherent in transhumanist fantasies of mind uploading, they ultimately remain ambiguous in their
critique of the dream of digital immortality.
Original Abstract: The paper about the transhumanistic era evaluates the
new postulates of the philosophical concept of transhumanism and the new possibilities it offers by
creating a new posthuman being with a newly constructed moral system. Through three thematic units, the
work reflects on transhumanistic ideas and the new paradigm of man, which is realized by means of
technological and scientific achievements.The first thematic unit discusses the philosophical idea of
transhumanism and the philosophical shift made by transhumanist anthropology, especially those
proclaimed in transhumanist manifestos. The second part provides an understanding of the means used by
technological transhumanism starting by cyborgization and mind uploading. The third part looks at the
new moral system brought by the new paradigm of posthuman ethics, which opposes the moral values of
Christian anthropology.
Original Abstract: Abstract
In Frankissstein: A Love Story, the British writer Jeanette Winterson reclaims the epistemological value
of the literary interpretation of existential questions around the posthuman. By retelling Mary
Shelley’s gothic classic, Winterson assesses, both ethically and aesthetically, the consequences of
artificial intelligence for traditional conceptions of gender, life (re)production, and the
commodification of bodily desires, as well as their fusion at the intersection of technology and art.
With the methodological support of recent studies on trans-/posthumanism and material/trans-corporeal
feminism(s), this article will attempt to show how, by revindicating monstrosity as the legitimization
of new forms of life and love, Winterson hybridizes trans- and posthumanist polarities and relativizes
the rigidity of the debate around the de- and rematerialization of nature in the face of practices such
as mind uploading, the mass production of sex robots, and enhancing biotechnologies, through a
technocritical examination of the risks and possibilities of the com-posting of human and nonhuman
matter.
Original Abstract: Mind uploading is the futurist idea of emulating all
brain processes of an individual on a computer. Progress towards achieving this technology is currently
limited by society's capability to study the human brain and the development of complex artificial
neural networks capable of emulating the brain's architecture. The goal of this chapter is to
provide a brief history of both categories, discuss the progress made, and note the roadblocks hindering
future research. Then, by examining the roadblocks of neuroscience and artificial intelligence together,
this chapter will outline a way to overcome their respective limitations by using the other field's
strengths.
THE MACHINE IN THE GHOST: TRANSHUMANISM AND THE ONTOLOGY OF INFORMATION: with Finley I. Lawson, “The
Science and Religion Forum Discuss Information and Reality: Questions for Religions and Science”; Niels
Henrik Gregersen, “‘The God with Clay’: The Idea of Deep Incarnation and the Informational Universe,”
Michael Burdett and King-Ho Leung, “The Machine in the Ghost: Transhumanism and the Ontology of
Information”; Marius Dorobantu and Fraser Watts, “Spiritual Intelligence: Processing Different
Information or Processing Information Differently?”; Matthew Kuan Johnson and Rachel Siow Robertson, “A
Co-Liberatory Framework for Big Data”; Peter M. Phillips, “Digital Theology and a Potential Theological
Approach to a Metaphysics of Information”; and Andrew Jackson, “Peacocke Prize Essay—Towards an Eastern
Orthodox Contemplation of Evolution: Maximus the Confessor's Vision of the Phylogenetic Logoi.”
Original Abstract: An ontology of information belies our common intuitions
about reality today and animates and governs both explicit scholarly study in philosophy and the
sciences as well as the ideologies that are growing out of them. Transhumanism is one such
technoscientific ideology that holds to a very specific ontology of information which need not be the
only one on offer. This article argues that the transhumanist ontology of information exhibits gnostic
and docetic religious overtones in it and that it devalues physical existence. At the same time, despite
claiming a rejection of supernature, hypothetical transhumanist practices (such as mind‐uploading) posit
the infosphere as a kind of supernatural realm that is often set in opposition to the natural world.
This article presents a critique of transhumanist conceptions of information and offers an alternative
ontology of information that more adequately accounts for the distinction between the natural and
supernatural as well as the integrity of the physical world.
Original Abstract: Harry Potter can be read as a critique of transhumanist
aims of achieving immortality or radical superlongevity. The salience of transhumanism for Harry Potter
is seen through the way that magic functions as an analogue to technology, and through the centrality of
death throughout the series. Transhumanists pursue radical superlongevity by three pathways:
bioengineering, cyborg engineering, and mind uploading. Each of these pathways, when applied
heuristically to the magical pursuit of immortality in Harry Potter, receives explicit rejection in the
text alongside the commendation of Harry’s non-pursuit of it. By way of analogy, Harry Potter’s
perspective on death and immortality, which is informed in part by the Christian tradition, offers
readers a critique of certain transhumanist aims along the lines of other ethical and religious analyses
of the movement, and speaks to the deep desires and longings lying at their heart.
Original Abstract: Victor Pelevin has established a reputation as one of
the most interesting, controversial, and mysterious contemporary Russian writers. He is recognized as
one of the leading representatives of Russian postmodernism. Pelevin is also known as an attentive and
critical observer of the surrounding reality. He is sometimes described as a deep thinker, a prophet,
and a visionary. Pelevin’s literary work entitled Transhumanism Inc. (2021) is the subject of the
analysis in this paper. The purpose of the article is to show and discuss Pelevin’s transhumanist vision
of the future in which an isolated brain (removed from its host) will be able to survive indefinitely in
a specialized container (‘a jar’) and human consciousness will exist within a virtual reality. However,
access to this ‘jar dimension’ will be exclusive, limited only to the wealthy, leaders, and world
oligarchs. However, it is the vampires, as supernatural creatures, who will be the real architects of
the world order. This paper focuses on the analysis of the selected aspects of Pelevin’s literary work −
mainly those which can be viewed in connection with the assumptions of the transhumanist project.
Special attention is paid to the idea of cyber immortality, the concept of morphological freedom, and
mind uploading.
Exploring moral perception and mind uploading in Kazuo Ishiguro's ‘Klara and the Sun':
ethical-aesthetic perspectives on identity attribution in artificial intelligence
Original Abstract: Literature wields a profound influence on our cognitive
processes, shaping not only how we think but also what we think about. Aesthetic experiences, in
particular, seem to foster a positive impact on our ability to comprehend complexity. This influence
underscores the significant role of literature in the exploration of value learning and ethics research,
because evaluating any decision-making requires seeking the widest possible frame of reference.
Furthermore, literature plays a pivotal role in enriching our perception of both the external world and
our inner selves, thereby fostering a heightened sense of ethical discernment. In this paper, I explore
this last idea by examining Kazuo Ishiguro'sKlara and the Sun. In this enquiry, I reveal
connections between two crucial controversies surrounding mind uploading: the epistemological debate
centered on the theory of moral perception and the ontological inquiry into personal identity.
Researching the intersection of these two big issues guide my decision to employ conceptual synthesis as
the methodological framework. Besides, I will argue that the ideas of moral perception and personal
identity that emerges in Ishiguro's dystopia are in tune with the narrativist hypothesis of Charles
Taylor. In my conclusions, I defend that prospect of replacing a human being with a robot hinges on the
challenge of instilling the machine with a unique moral perception. This remains an elusive goal,
perhaps perpetually so, due to the inherent impossibility of objectifying a machine capable of
apprehending and processing the non-objective qualities of matter. Furthermore, even if we were able to
create such a machine, it would likely resist assuming a substitutive role, as it would quickly discover
and appreciate its own existence. Finally, I ponder the implications of mistaking a simulation of human
for an authentic replica, namely, an unsuccessful and unnoticed attempt at mind uploading—loneliness.
Original Abstract: Abstract
Robert Doede’s chapter on the intellectual history of technology will provide the interpretive framework
for the remaining chapters in this volume. In his contribution, he delineates some of the key conceptual
shifts—the late medieval via moderna, early modern science’s mechanical metaphors for the universe, the
late modern information revolution—in the history of the West that have crucially contributed to the
plausibility of the contemporary transhumanist project of engineering mind-uploading. Doede explains how
it is that contemporary scientists, philosophers, and intelligent laypersons find it easy, indeed almost
natural, to take seriously that they are beings whose living identities are capable of being captured as
digital software patterns, thereby decoupled from their vital bodies, and then uploaded onto a
non-biodegradable substrate where they can carry on their lives in perpetuity; and why such a vision is,
despite its mechanistic grammar, one fundamentally characterized as a striving for the re-enchantment of
the world.
Original Abstract: Problematyka artykułu skupia się wokół zagadnienia
awataryzacji w kontekście transhumanistycznej koncepcji cyberimmortalizmu. Awataryzacja jest omawiana
jako proces uobecniania się człowieka pod postacią cyfrową, czego ostatecznym etapem ma być – według
niektórych transhumanistów i futurystów – wyłonienie się cyfrowego post-człowieka. Celem artykułu jest
charakterystyka cyberimmortalizmu na tle innych transhumanistycznych nurtów oraz omówienie wyzwań
związanych z ideą transferu umysłu (antropologicznych, metafizycznych oraz społecznych).
Original Abstract: Abstract
In this chapter, Thomas Fuchs argues, from a psychiatrist’s perspective and against the intrinsically
mind-body-dualistic understanding of human beings advocated by transhumanists, that processes of life
and processes of consciousness are inseparably linked through the living body as a whole. In the unity
of the person, both aspects are intertwined: the body is alive and therefore also mindful; the mind is
alive and therefore also truly embodied. Fuchs also demonstrates the importance of embodied cognition
for psychiatry. This medical discipline is increasingly dominated by brain-centered research that
focuses on drug treatment, deep-brain stimulation, and neuroenhancement designed only to change the
person’s psyche. Fuchs argues that such an approach neglects both the embodied and relational structure
of the human mind and risks rendering the patient dependent on mere technical support. Durable
therapeutic changes can only be achieved through personal, i.e., embodied and interactive
experiences—and these over time also influence the neuronal substrate through a circular interaction of
‘process’ and ‘structure.’
Original Abstract: Mind upload, or the digital copying of an individual
brain and mind, could theoretically allow one to “live forever.” If such a technology became available,
who would be most likely to approve of it or condemn it? Research has shown that fear of death
positively predicts the moral approval of hypothetical mind upload technology, while religiosity may
have the opposite effect. We build on these findings, drawing also from work on religiosity and
existential mattering as predictors of perceived meaning in one’s life. In a cross-sectional study
(N = 1,007), we show that existential mattering and afterlife beliefs are negatively associated with
moral approval of mind upload technology: people who believe there is a soul or some form of afterlife
and who also report a high level of existential mattering, are least likely to morally approve of mind
upload technology. Indeed, mind uploading—if it ever becomes feasible—is a form of technology that would
fundamentally redraw the existential boundaries of what it means to be human.
Original Abstract: Abstract
This chapter aims to uncover and challenge the predominant portrayal of the AI engineer as a
hypermasculine ‘alpha geek’. Taking as their starting point the aforementioned underrepresentation of
women in the AI industry, they outline why cultural representations of AI scientists matter, before
explaining the findings of their large quantitative study of a corpus of 142 influential films
(1920–2020) containing AI. They discuss the key tropes that emerged from these films, before focusing on
four key themes that are distinctly gendered and may contribute to the underrepresentation of women in
the AI industry: first, the AI scientist as a ‘genius’; second, the AI scientist’s ability to gain
mastery over life and death through the pursuit of ‘mind uploading’ and other forms of technological
immortality; third, the association of AI with hypermasculine milieus, such as the military; and
finally, the portrayal of female AI scientists as subservient or inferior to male AI scientists.
Original Abstract: This research aims to delve into the intricate and
multilayered connection between humans and posthumans, as depicted in Hannu Rajaniemi's Jean le
Flambeur trilogy. This Finnish American author's trilogy, consisting of The Quantum Thief (2010),
The Fractal Prince (2012), and The Causal Angel (2014), paints an insightful picture of this
interaction. The investigation aims to illuminate the emergence of humanity in an extremely posthuman
and postsingular landscape, arguing that one must understand humanity as not entirely separate from
posthumanism. Instead, humanity should be considered a specific case, or limit case, of the broader
posthumanist concept. The form of humanity that arises from the boundaries of an extreme posthuman state
of evolution will not mirror the pre-posthuman state; instead, it will transform into a more
comprehensive, inclusive entity. The analysis of these three novels will illustrate how Rajaniemi's
work does not entirely dismiss human agency. Instead, it recontextualizes and reshapes it within a
dramatically different posthuman setting.
Original Abstract: AbstractOne possible way to decolonize the posthuman
field of literary criticism is to find possible stylistic and thematic affinities between the
literatures from the less technologically advanced regions such as South Asia and mainstream
Euro-American science fiction. This article invites and affirms alternative ways of perceiving and
comprehending the transhumanist posthuman paradigms from the technologically underdeveloped world (South
Asia) through a critically informed analysis of the motifs, symbols, and characters in the Pakistani
writer Uzma Aslam Khan’s Anglophone novel Trespassing (2003). It argues that the nonhuman agency of
truck art in Trespassing can be interpreted as a metaphor for a possible local technique for
consciousness uploading. By applying the theoretical framework of transhumanist/posthumanist literary
theory, this article demonstrates that the depiction of truck art in the novel can be analyzed as an
analogy for the transhumanist posthuman dream of whole brain emulation.
Original Abstract: Cet article examine les propositions de R. Kurzweil à
l’aune de son propre parcours. Il s’agit de démontrer que ces conceptions peuvent éclairer d’un nouveau
jour les propos freudiens visant à distinguer le deuil de la mélancolie. Le fondateur de l’université de
la Singularité, financée notamment par l’entreprise Google, fait régulièrement des déclarations
spectaculaires sur l’avancée disruptive toute prochaine des progrès technologiques. Si la plupart des
experts s’accordent sur le caractère hautement spéculatif de ses assertions, malgré tout l’idéologie
transhumaniste infiltre le discours courant et témoigne d’une nouvelle actualité des problématiques
eschatologiques. Nous interrogeons le discours transhumaniste au travers du prisme de la parole de
R. Kurzweil en soulignant que sa conception de la finitude humaine (son souhait formulé de vaincre la
mort) lui advient à la suite du décès de son propre père. Kurzweil indique également que cette
conception de la vie « immortelle » en passe par un traitement du corps particulier, qu’il s’agit de
surveiller et de traiter pour, in fine , espérer s’en passer (« mind uploading »). Sur ce point du
traitement du corps comme machine, voire comme déchet, la clinique psychopathologique se révèle
également féconde en précédents.
Original Abstract: In recent years and, in light of the latest developments
in the field of neurotechnology, some critics have claimed that mind uploading could become technically
feasible in a not-too-distant future. While transhumanist critics embrace this procedure and dream of a
postbiological future in which human beings possess greater cognitive, emotional, and sensorial
abilities, the critical posthumanists warn of the risks inherent to the idea of leaving biology behind
to lead a virtual life in cyberspace. Significantly, these warnings reverberate in some twenty-first
century cultural productions such as Mark McClelland’s Upload (2012), a novel that is also
representative of an emerging trend of SF novels written by tech professionals. Although the novel may
seem to be at first a defense of simulated life, this work aims to prove that McClelland’s narrative
choices ultimately uncover a critical posthumanist view of embodiment as an essential part of human
identity.
Original Abstract: Zusammenfassung
Ich möchte in diesem Artikel aufzeigen, dass ein Leben oder zumindest eine Fortexistenz des Subjekts
nach dem physischen Tod aus anthropologischer Sicht durchaus nicht ausgeschlossen, die Fortexistenz
einer Person durch die (vermeintliche) Übertragung ihres Geistes auf eine Festplatte (mind-uploading
bzw. whole brain emulation) dagegen aus prinzipiellen Gründen unmöglich ist. Beide Thesen lassen sich
durch eine Reflexion auf die humane Verfassung begründen.
Original Abstract: AbstractThe embryo space colonization (ESC) concept is
an interesting, very rational and quite effective way to guarantee the survival of the human species, as
long as the technology is achieved and no unforeseen complications arise during even many millions of
years journey to an exoplanet. Despite these formal advantages of the concept, this paper points to a
number of arguments against its validity. These arguments revolve around two issues. One is to point out
that while the concept of saving the Homo sapiens species is noble and should be supported, the way of
saving humanity envisioned by the ESC departs from what should be understood by the concept of saving
humanity through space colonization. The second issue is to draw attention to the ethical controversies
that make this concept perhaps unsuitable for implementation at all. At least some of these objections
do not address the concept of saving humanity by sending adult living persons on space missions.
Original Abstract: AbstractThis chapter examines the history of
human-machine assemblages used to speak for the dead, comparing the practices of the nineteenth-century
American Spiritualist movement with those of present-day transhumanist mind-uploading. In both cases,
forms of mediated communication give the dead a continuing voice in society through a participatory
performance involving the medium—a person whose consciousness is suspended in a state of trance, or a
set of algorithms—the deceased, and an audience. Mediumship becomes a theater in which audiences both
desire and interrogate the capabilities of necro-communication technology. The chapter attends to these
technologies’ implied models of selfhood, which disaggregate mental content—software—from the vehicle of
its expression—hardware—in the tradition of Cartesian dualism. The chapter argues that the technologies
in question inevitably structure, in concerning ways, political notions of possessive individualism,
which become commoditized in the shift from human-performed mediumship to selfhood instantiated in
proprietary software products.
Original Abstract: Part 1 concluded by introducing the concept of the new
ontological category – explaining how our cognitive machinery does not have natural and intuitive
understanding of robots and AIs, unlike we have for animals, tools, and plants. Here the authors review
findings in the moral psychology of robotics and transhumanism. They show that many peculiarities arise
from the interaction of human cognition with robots, AIs, and human enhancement technologies. Robots are
treated similarly, but not completely, like humans. Some such peculiarities are explained by mind
perception mechanisms. On the other hand, it seems that transhumanistic technologies like brain implants
and mind uploading are condemned, and the condemnation is motivated by our innate sexual disgust
sensitivity mechanisms.
Original Abstract: Nos proponemos en este artículo analizar dos obras
recientes que tienen como tema común la utopía de la inmortalidad alcanzada a través de los medios
tecnólogicos, esto es, la mind uploading, la “subida”: el cuento del mexicano Alberto Chimal “La segunda
Celeste”, incluido en Manos de lumbre (2018), y la novela escrita en forma de crónica Sinfín (2020) del
argentino Martín Caparrós. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que las dos obras tratan el tema de la “subida”
como una utopía en el sentido dado a este término por Matthew Beaumont, es decir, una mirada sobre un
presente historizado desde la perspectiva de un futuro fantástico, y reflejan más bien las
contradicciones de la presente visión sobre lo humano que una cala real en un futuro implacablemente
opaco. Al mismo tiempo, mostraremos que en las dos obras se transparenta la paradoja observada por
Fredic Jameson respecto a la imposibilidad de distinguir entre la utopía y la distopía en el momento en
que se trata de indagar el futuro. Por fin, intentaremos poner de relieve que, en los dos textos, la
utópica “subida”, que es uno de los objetivos fundamentales de la agenda transhumanista, se contempla
con el escepticismo derivado de una visión pesimista sobre un sujeto que accede a la tecnología sin ser
capaz de superar sus debilidades humanas, por lo cual, fracasa en su intento de convertirse en
“post-humano”.
Original Abstract: Transhumanism has enormous effect on temporary
philosophical thought by forcing philosophers to take on many intellectual challenges. Not only
philosophers deal with transhumanism but also scientists who try to create technological solutions that
enable implementation of transhumanistic ideas. The question is whether all these ideas will be
realized. The purpose of the article is to show that not all transhumanist aspirations can be put into
practice. The first reason is that transhumanism limits human’s understanding to the material dimension
(from a theological point of view). While this is understandable in the naturalistic paradigm, this
approach is insufficient when it comes to all complexity of human being and for this reason tanshumanism
represents too narrow a human’s understanding to be able to implement its all assumptions. The second
reason is that to enable people to become posthumans the latest technologies would have to be available
to everyone and this seems impossible. If so, such a situation will divide people into ordinary people
and posthumans and this could lead to conflicts that transhumanists want to avoid after all. Finally,
the body-mind problem is essentially limited to emergentism, which corresponds to the naturalistic
paradigm. It seems, however, that without the concept of the soul it is impossible to understand who a
man is, his/her identity and consciousness and this is crucial for mind uploading.
Original Abstract: There is not just a desire but a profound human need for
enhancement - the irrepressible yearning to become better than ourselves. Today, enhancement is often
conceived of in terms of biotechnical intervention: genetic modification, prostheses, implants, drug
therapy - even mind uploading. The theme of this book is an ancient form of enhancement: a physical
upgrade that involves ethical practices of self-realization. It has been called
'angelification' - a transformation by which people become angels. The parallel process is
'daimonification', or becoming daimones. Ranging in time from Hesiod and Empedocles through
Plato and Origen to Plotinus and Christian gnostics, this book explores not only how these two forms of
posthuman transformation are related, but also how they connect and chasten modern visions of
transhumanist enhancement which generally lack a robust account of moral improvement.
Original Abstract: Hierdie artikel stel ondersoek in na die wyses waarop
die konsep van utopie en/of die utopiese met 'n Deleuziaanse konsep van wording en/of anderswording
in verband gebring kan word. Aangesien 'n tematisering van utopie, of alternatiewelik 'n
problematisering van hierdie begrip, dikwels in die wetenskapsfiksie-genre vergestalt word, word vir die
doeleindes van dié ondersoek die wetenskapsfiksie-trilogie van regisseur Neill Blomkamp bespreek. Op
verhaalvlak is daar in District 9, Elysium en Chappie telkens voorbeelde van wording of anderswording,
wat elk in terme van 'n utopiese horison geïnterpreteer kan word. Hoewel die protagonis van
District 9 anders word, is die utopie waarop Wikus wag 'n terugskouende en statiese restourasie van
die verlede. En hoewel Max in Elysium betreklik min verander, realiseer hy deur middel van sy
lewensoffer 'n oënskynlike utopie vir almal, wat by nabetragting egter insgelyks 'n statiese
opvatting van utopie verraai - 'n wêreld wat die distopiese saad reeds in sy kern dra. Chappie skyn
die enigste film van die trilogie te wees om Deleuze se idee van wording met utopie as die dinamiese
utopiese in verband te bring.
Original Abstract: Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico
han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el
presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a
la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad
morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos
de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las
cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al
‘volcado de la mente’.
Original Abstract: Elon Musk regularly advertises for the simulation
argument, stressing that he regards it as highly likely that we live in a computer simulation. However,
it must be noted that the argument can be reconstructed such that its line of thought can be rationally
grasped. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is a plausible argument. The argument
presupposes the anthropology that human beings can be uploaded onto a hard drive, which is based upon
the view that humans are nothing like a software running on our body which serves as our hardware. It is
this understanding of the human species which has been employed by many transhumanists who stress that
immortality is near. The author will explain the line of thought underlining the simulation argument
while they will, at the same time, explain that it is neither highly likely that we live in a computer
simulation, nor that we can upload our personalities onto a computer, and even if this was possible, it
would not enable us to become immortal.
Original Abstract: RESUMO Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar os
atuais discursos em torno do problema da imortalidade tecnológica presentes em algumas ficções
científicas recentes. Essas ficções serão tomadas como ponto de partida para uma discussão sobre as
implicações filosóficas decorrentes da possibilidade do mind uploading, principalmente no que se refere
a uma ideia de transcendência e abandono do corpo. Por fim, questiona-se qual o lugar dos sonhos
utópicos de imortalidade em meio à crise de futuro que vivemos atualmente, relacionada principalmente
com a discussão em torno das mudanças climáticas e da insustentabilidade dos atuais modos de vida
capitalistas.
Original Abstract: Background:While modern humans seek ways to extend life
expectancy, the necessity of advanced bioengineering tools for the production of effective human
enhancement applications appears as compelling as ever.Objective:The technological future of Homo
sapiens has been scheduled within a quantum environment and advanced physical interventions are
imperative to occur in the anatomy of modern humans, including genetic improvement and human cloning.
New terminologies and latest projects such as genome editing, mind uploading and tissue engineering
applications for the growth of new organs are issues of discussion in this paper.Methods:Several
advanced biotechnological methods are presented in this paper, including the 14-days rule, the 2045
Initiative project and the CRISPR technique and their social and ethical implications are
discussed.Results:The exponential aging of the population results in rapidly increasing demands for
next-generation drugs and innovative pharmaceutical products that target individualized genetic
treatment, resulting in the emergence of controversial ethical and social implications in the
forthcoming post-Homo sapiens Era.Conclusion:The next-generation ethics must be clarified, an
interdisciplinary debate should be initiated, and all the different perspectives must be recorded and
evaluated to adopt the most efficient practices for controversial topics like the potential digital
immortality.
Original Abstract: Transhumanism is one of the main “ideologies of the
future” that has emerged in recent decades. Its program for the enhancement of the human species during
this century pursues the ultimate goal of immortality, through the creation of human brain emulations.
Therefore, transhumanism offers its fol- lowers an explicit eschatology, a vision of the ultimate future
of our civilization that in some cases coincides with the ultimate future of the universe, as in Frank
Tipler’s Omega Point theory. The essay aims to analyze the points of comparison and opposition between
transhumanist and Christian eschatologies, in particular considering the “incarnationist” view of
Parousia. After an introduction concern- ing the problems posed by new scientific and cosmological
theories to traditional Christian eschatology, causing the debate between “incarnationists” and “escha-
tologists,” the article analyzes the transhumanist idea of mind-uploading through the possibility of
making emulations of the human brain and perfect simulations of the reality we live in. In the last
section the problems raised by these theories are analyzed from the point of Christian theology, in
particular the proposal of a transhuman species through the emulation of the body and mind of human
beings. The possibility of a transhumanist eschatology in line with the incarnationist view of Parousia
is refused.
MIND UPLOADING AND EMBODIED COGNITION: A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE: with Robert M. Geraci and Simon Robinson,
“Introduction to the Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Apocalypticism”; Beth Singler,
“Existential Hope and Existential Despair in AI Apocalypticism and Transhumanism”; Michael Morelli, “The
Athenian Altar and the Amazonian Chatbot: A Pauline Reading of Artificial Intelligence and Apocalyptic
Ends”; Victoria Lorrimar, “Mind Uploading and Embodied Cognition: A Theological Response”; and Syed
Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential Risk,’ or the Entangled Apocalypticism of Artificial
Intelligence.”
Original Abstract: One of the more radical transhumanist proposals for
future human being envisions the uploading of our minds to a digital substrate, trading our dependence
on frail, degenerating “meat” bodies for the immortality of software existence. Yet metaphor studies
indicate that our use of metaphor operates in our bodily inhabiting of the world, and a phenomenological
approach emphasizes a “hybridity” to human being that resists traditional mind/body dichotomies. Future
scenarios envisioning mind uploading and disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) share an apocalyptic
category with more traditional religious eschatologies, though they differ markedly in content;
therefore, the insights of embodied cognition and their uptake in technological innovation are
considered as they apply to theological concerns. Theology often functions in debates over the
technological future to critique or to caution. However, theologians may learn from their technological
dialogue partners when it comes to the future of embodiment and its implications for the construction
and practice of theology.
EXISTENTIAL HOPE AND EXISTENTIAL DESPAIR IN AI APOCALYPTICISM AND TRANSHUMANISM: with Robert M. Geraci
and Simon Robinson, “Introduction to the Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Apocalypticism”; Beth
Singler, “Existential Hope and Existential Despair in AI Apocalypticism and Transhumanism”; Michael
Morelli, “The Athenian Altar and the Amazonian Chatbot: A Pauline Reading of Artificial Intelligence and
Apocalyptic Ends”; Victoria Lorrimar, “Mind Uploading and Embodied Cognition: A Theological Response”;
and Syed Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential Risk,’ or the Entangled Apocalypticism of
Artificial Intelligence.”
Original Abstract: Drawing on observations from on‐ and offline fieldwork
among transhumanists and artificial superintelligence/singularity‐focused groups, this article will
explore an anthropology of anxiety around the hoped for, or feared, posthuman future. It will lay out
some of the varieties of existential hope and existential despair found in these discussions about
predicted events such as the “end of the world” and place them within an anthropological theoretical
framework. Two examples will be considered. First, the optimism observed at a transhumanist event will
be examined to emphasize the positive affective aspects of certain apocalypse scenarios, especially
those with an implicit eschatological direction. Second, an online location where examples of
existential despair can be noted will be explored further to demonstrate the kinds of negative responses
to certain superintelligence/singularity ideas. These examples of existential hope and despair will
demonstrate the intrinsic role of anxiety in ideas about a future artificial intelligence apocalypse.
THE ATHENIAN ALTAR AND THE AMAZONIAN CHATBOT: A PAULINE READING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
APOCALYPTIC ENDS: with Robert M. Geraci and Simon Robinson, “Introduction to the Symposium on Artificial
Intelligence and Apocalypticism”; Beth Singler, “Existential Hope and Existential Despair in AI
Apocalypticism and Transhumanism”; Michael Morelli, “The Athenian Altar and the Amazonian Chatbot: A
Pauline Reading of Artificial Intelligence and Apocalyptic Ends”; Victoria Lorrimar, “Mind Uploading and
Embodied Cognition: A Theological Response”; and Syed Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential
Risk,’ or the Entangled Apocalypticism of Artificial Intelligence.”
Original Abstract: This article explores questions about chatbots in
particular and artificial intelligence (AI) in general from a Pauline, that is, a Christian theological
perspective. It does so in a way that focuses on a particular scene in the New Testament: Paul in the
Athenian Areopagus, considering an altar to an “unknown God,” quoting Greek poets and philosophers, and
sharing curious theology as he dialogues with Stoic and Epicurean thinkers (Acts 17:16–34). By examining
the sociohistorical nuances of this scene and their philosophical and theological implications, this
article shows how the altar Paul considers philosophically and theologically becomes the focal point for
an important dialogue about apocalyptic ends, or ideas about who we are, where we are going, and who or
what is responsible for that who‐ness and where‐ness. In turn, this can teach us how to ask practical
questions, which can uncover the unsuspected apocalyptic ends represented by, or even contained within,
common technological objects such as chatbots.
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND APOCALYPTICISM: with Robert M. Geraci and
Simon Robinson, “Introduction to the Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Apocalypticism”; Beth
Singler, “Existential Hope and Existential Despair in AI Apocalypticism and Transhumanism”; Michael
Morelli, “The Athenian Altar, the Amazonian Chatbot: A Pauline Reading of Artificial Intelligence and
Apocalyptic Ends”; Victoria Lorrimar, “Mind Uploading and Embodied Cognition: A Theological Response”;
and Syed Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential Risk,’ or the Entangled Apocalypticism of
Artificial Intelligence.”
Original Abstract: This is an introduction to the Symposium on Artificial
Intelligence and Apocalypticism, which resulted from a conference hosted by the Centre for the Critical
Study of Apocalyptic and Millenarian Movements (CenSAMM) in Bedford, UK. The introduction provides a
brief history of scholarly work in the intersections of apocalypticism and artificial intelligence and
of the emergence of CenSAMM from a millenarian religious community, the Panacea Society. It concludes by
pointing toward the contributions of the symposium's essays.
“WHITE CRISIS” AND/AS “EXISTENTIAL RISK,” OR THE ENTANGLED APOCALYPTICISM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
with Robert M. Geraci and Simon Robinson, “Introduction to the Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and
Apocalypticism”; Beth Singler, “Existential Hope and Existential Despair in AI Apocalypticism and
Transhumanism”; Michael Morelli, “The Athenian Altar and the Amazonian Chatbot: A Pauline Reading of
Artificial Intelligence and Apocalyptic Ends”; Victoria Lorrimar, “Mind Uploading and Embodied
Cognition: A Theological Response”; and Syed Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential Risk,’ or
the Entangled Apocalypticism of Artificial Intelligence.”
Original Abstract: In this article, I present a critique of Robert
Geraci's Apocalyptic artificial intelligence (AI) discourse, drawing attention to certain
shortcomings which become apparent when the analytical lens shifts from religion to the race–religion
nexus. Building on earlier work, I explore the phenomenon of existential risk associated with
Apocalyptic AI in relation to “White Crisis,” a modern racial phenomenon with premodern religious
origins. Adopting a critical race theoretical and decolonial perspective, I argue that all three
phenomena are entangled and they should be understood as a strategy, albeit perhaps merely rhetorical,
for maintaining white hegemony under nonwhite contestation. I further suggest that this claim can be
shown to be supported by the disclosure of continuity through change in the long‐durée entanglement of
race and religion associated with the establishment, maintenance, expansion, and refinement of the
modern/colonial world system if and when such phenomena are understood as iterative shifts in a
programmatic trajectory of domination which might usefully be framed as “algorithmic racism.”
Original Abstract: The problem of total mind uploading (and consciousness)
is far from fully solved at present within both the scientific and philosophical paradigms. At the same
time, the hypothesis that a robot clone would represent a substitute of one's own person (based on
the mindclone argument) questions not only the future ontological status of robot clones (in society)
but also its possible personhood quality, in a process whose result is the overthrow of
anthropocentrism, seen as the fundamental ideological definition of human nature. Thus, this research is
aimed at analyzing technoimmortality in the robot clones paradigm, starting from the theories of Martine
Rothblatt and Ray Kurzweil regarding mind uploading in cyberconsciousness and robot clones theory. The
overall objective of this paper is to analyze the hypothesis of robot clones' personhood quality,
along with the ontological status issue, based on the arguments of Immanuel Kant, Lynne Rudder Baker,
and John Searl. The theoretical objective follows to deconstruct the way in which mind cloning
(consciousness theory) into a humanoid robot clone, supported by the arguments of Martine Rothblatt, Ray
Kurzweil, and Daniel Dennett, actually leads to a simulacrum of our own person—namely a
philosophical zombie—according to the theories put forth by Ned Block, David Chalmers, and
Searl. The methodology used is that of Rothblatt, Dennett, and Kurzweil's functional argumentation,
alongside Block, Searl, and Chalmers's critique of the artificial consciousness of robot clones,
completed by Kantian's argumentative critique of robot clone personhood.
Original Abstract: Eighty years ago, Nicholas Berdyaev cautioned that new
technological problems needed to be addressed with a new philosophical anthropology. Today, the
transhumanist goal of mind uploading is perceived by many theologians and philosophers to be dangerous
due to its violation of the human person. I contrast transhumanist “patternist” views of the person with
Brent Waters’s Augustinian view of the technological pilgrim, Celia Deane-Drummond’s evolutionary
Thomistic view of humanity, and Francis Fukuyama’s insistence on the inviolability of “Factor X”. These
latter three thinkers all disagree with the patternist position, but their views are also discordant
with each other. This disagreement constitutes a challenge for people of faith confronting
transhumanism—which view is to be taken right? I contend that Science, Technology and Society (STS)
studies can enrich our understanding of the debates by highlighting the transmutation of philosophical
view into scientific theory and the intermingled nature of our forms of knowledge. Furthermore, I
contend that STS helps Christians understand the evolution of their own anthropologies and suggests some
prospects for future theological anthropology.